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Differentiated Regulation: The case of charities 
 
Abstract 
The increasing number and influence of charities in the economy, allegations and evidence of fraud 
and mismanagement, and the need for information to inform policy, are all reasons for the 
establishment of charity regulators. Public interest and public choice provide underlying theories 
explaining charity regulation which aims to increase public trust and confidence in charities (and 
thus increases philanthropy), and to limit tax benefits to specific organisations and donors. 
Disclosure-based regulatory regimes are a common model for charities regulation in many 
jurisdictions. Nevertheless, these can be resource intensive for the regulator and regulated charities, 
and growing pressure on government budgets requires efficiencies to be found.   
This paper proposes regulation differentiated according to charities’ main resource providers. This 
could reduce cost and increase the regulator’s effectiveness through focusing effort. In addition, this 
differentiation segments charity types according to the theories that explain why these organisations 
form and operate. We demonstrate the feasibility of such segmentation by use of cluster analysis of 
data on New Zealand registered charities and show which charities could benefit from differentiated 
regulation.   
 
Keywords: Charity Regulation; Nonprofit Organisations; Regulation Efficiency; Differentiated 
Regulation 
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Differentiated Regulation: The case of charities 
1. Introduction 
To address calls for greater accountability and transparency from organisations engaged in ‘good 
work’, a number of jurisdictions have recently established charity regulators (for example, 
establishments include the Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission in 2012, the Charity 
Commission for Northern Ireland in 2010, and in 2006, New Zealand’s Charities Commission and 
Singapore’s Commissioner of Charities). In addition to responding to “scandals and doubts about 
public trust and confidence” (Connolly & Hyndman, 2013, p. 946), some calls for regulation are from 
those concerned that public policy would otherwise be undertaken in a vacuum, due to a lack of 
knowledge about the size and reach of the charitable sector (for example, Ferguson, 2005). 
While many nonprofit organizations are required to comply with ‘business’ regulation (for example, 
Occupational Health and Safety), this research focuses on regulation designed to monitor the 
operation of organizations that are defined in law as charities. In many jurisdictions, there are 
specific benefits available to registered charities, which include: exemption from taxation on income 
(specifically surpluses), reduced state and local taxes, preferential access to government and 
philanthropic funds, and taxation rebates for donors (Abramson, Salamon, & Steurle, 2006; Breen, 
Ford, & Morgan, 2009; Smith, 2012). Governments have good reason to support charities and 
philanthropists, as these actors can reduce the burden on state funds (Hyndman & McMahon, 2011; 
Mayer & Wilson, 2010). Nevertheless, governments also regulate to restrict the number and type of 
organizations that can continue to avail themselves of these taxation and other benefits. Such 
regulation may also increase public trust and confidence in this sector; and potentially increase 
philanthropy (Breen, 2009).  
Yet, the economic downturn from 2009 and general pressure on government budgets has meant 
that charity regulators have been affected by government cost-cutting measures (Mayer & Wilson, 
2010), thus efficiencies are required. This research asks: what is an optimally efficient regulatory 
strategy that will increase public trust and confidence in cost-effective ways? New Zealand data 
utilised in this research supports the proposition that not all of the charities registering with their 
regulator in order to avail themselves of benefits require government oversight, as they already 
have primary resource providers who exercise oversight responsibilities. We posit that, instead of 
spreading reduced regulatory resources ever-more thinly, differentiated regulation provides a useful 
strategy for charity regulators to focus regulatory effort, increase effectiveness and reduce costs. 
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Differentiated regulation requires an effective segmentation of charities according to their main 
resource providers. In this research, we demonstrate (using cluster analysis) that such segmentation 
can be achieved, and that it is useful to the development of differentiated regulation and regulatory 
theories. Such differentiation also links to specific theories explaining why these organisations form 
and operate. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows.  In section 2 we discuss the theories that explain 
why charities form and operate. In section 3 we review the arguments for regulation. In section 4, 
we introduce differentiated regulation. In section 5 we present our empirical analysis to 
demonstrate the feasibility of segmenting charities consistent with differentiated regulation. Section 
6 concludes the paper with discussion of our results and identification of opportunities for further 
research. 
2. The charities sector  
The rise of charity regulators is related to the increasing number and reach of nonprofit 
organizations in general and charities in particular,i especially as governments increasingly contract 
with charities to deliver social services (Hyndman & McMahon, 2011; Mayer & Wilson, 2010). This 
section overviews the major economic theories describing why charities emerge and therefore who 
their main resource providers will be. These are: market failure, government failure, voluntary 
failure, and contracting for ‘trust goods’. In the last part of this section, we highlight the strident calls 
for regulating these organizations.   
2.1. Theories explaining the rise of the sector 
Market failure and government failure can explain why organizations form which deliver public/ 
collective goods and services and do not distribute profits to owners. These organizations are likely 
to receive funds from donors, governments and, to a lesser extent, payment from service recipients. 
Rose-Ackerman (1986) argues that market failure occurs when goods can be delivered at a lower net 
cost (after the cost of contracting) by nonprofit rather than for-profit organizations. This will occur 
when the nonprofit organization is prepared to earn less than the cost of capital, and/or draw on 
voluntary labour donations. Nonprofit providers cater to those who cannot afford to pay the market 
price and thus can supplement the work of for-profit providers who will service only those clients 
who can and are willing to pay the market price.ii They will seek funding from donations (including 
bequests and sponsorships) and, because market failure also occurs in relation to the provision of 
public or collective goods, government will also be a major resource provider. In respect of public 
goods, for-profit organizations are not inclined to deliver these goods owing to free-riders. 
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Government can reduce such market failure through taxes and incentives to encourage service 
provision by others (Weisbrod, 1988, 1989).   
While governments may use taxes and incentives to remedy market failure, nevertheless, when 
government is forced to step in as a provider or major funder, services it supplies tend to be 
homogeneous, not cognisant of diversity in communities, and hence government failure can occur.iii 
Nonprofit organizations emerge to reduce government failure by meeting the diverse needs of 
specific (heterogeneous) communities (Weisbrod, 1989), drawing on resources from government, 
donations, bequests and sponsorships.  
The extent to which nonprofit organizations can continue to operate is dependent on such external 
funding and, without sufficient patronage or government support, they will fail (Salamon, 1987 
terms this “voluntary failure”). Studies utilising this theory include Sutton, Baskerville and Cordery 
(2010) who analysed the failure of a national charity as it lost legitimacy with the donating public 
and government. Robbins and Lapsley (2008) also utilised the theory to analyse voluntary failure in 
the Irish hospital charitable sector, citing the reduction in resourcing as inflation impacted 
endowment funds, donations fell and costs rose.  
A further reason for the rise of nonprofit organisations is provided by Ben-Ner (1986). When 
information asymmetry limits consumers’ ability to assess service quality, they are more likely to 
form their own organizations to ensure quality, or transact for these ‘trust goods’ with a nonprofit 
organization (Ben-Ner, 1986). Trust good transactions include, for example, when a child commits 
their parent with dementia to an aged care facility. Here, they cannot observe the quality of care, 
nor may the parent be able to adequately inform them. In these and similar situations, member 
management of nonprofit member-based organizations signals that the services can be obtained at 
a cost and quality that the members prefer (Cleveland & Krashinsky, 2009). Further, Cleveland and 
Krashinsky (2009) show that, in well-developed markets, these nonprofit providers also provide 
higher quality care than for-profit providers. While they may be effective, yet Weisbrod (1989) notes 
that these organizations’ managers have less incentive to be efficient than managers in for-profit 
businesses, therefore they require greater monitoring of their financial and social performance. The 
main resource providers – members who have formed and who fund the organisation – will take 
responsibility for this task.  
From this brief explanation of market failure, government failure, voluntary failure and trust goods, 
it follows that nonprofit organizations are a significant part of the social infrastructure.  
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2.2. Support through taxation relief 
In addition to supplementing government services in basic areas such as, health and social services, 
the charity sector includes organizations that enrich cultural diversity within society (for example, 
arts organizations), contribute to individuals’ well-being (for example, sports organizations) and in so 
doing, develop social capital within communities (Bryce, 2005). Governments must decide which of 
these non-market additions to public and collective goods they should support and how. Often they 
exempt charities from certain taxes and provide tax rebates to donors (Mayer & Wilson, 2010). 
Fries (2003, p. 8) notes that charities provide opportunities enabling “citizens to contribute to the 
public good on their own initiative”. Citizens may offer funds, voluntary labour, labour at a reduced 
cost, or donate goods, thus enabling a nonprofit organization to reduce its service costs (James, 
1987). When government is also a funder of these goods, it will also seek to encourage philanthropy 
and thus reduce demands on it to provide more funding. Philanthropy should grow when there is 
increased public trust and confidence in these charities; Breen (2009) notes that philanthropy will be 
more forthcoming and better targeted if fundraising regulation is effective. 
A major tax benefit often extended to charities is an income tax exemption on surpluses from 
trading activities and income from investments. Tax-exempt bodies potentially enjoy a competitive 
advantage over for-profit businesses; this advantage is further extended if they use volunteers to 
deliver goods and services (Dalton & Casey, 2008).iv Yet, nonprofit trading concerns could be 
disadvantaged by their limited access to finance and credit. Further, a lack of horizontal equity exists 
between the nonprofit, for-profit and public sectors, as public sector organizations are both tax-
exempt and also potentially have better access to credit and finance. Accordingly, income tax 
exemption is often viewed as appropriate to recognise nonprofit organizations’ activities.  
2.3.  Calls for regulation 
Financial and governance scandals have seen increasing calls for charities regulation (Ferguson, 2005; 
Gaskin, 1999). For example, Fremont-Smith and Kosaras (2003) found 152 reported cases of fraud in 
US charities, yet acknowledged that these were only the ‘tip of the iceberg’, as many instances of 
fraud are not reported in the media. Further, Gibelman and Gelman’s (2004) international research 
found wrongdoing in charities included theft, misconduct, excessive compensation, and 
mismanagement of resources. It is unsurprising, therefore, that declining public confidence in 
charities (due in part to such scandals) has led to calls for enhanced charity accountability and 
regulation (Gaskin, 1999; Gibelman & Gelman, 2004).  
Due to the sensitivity when resources provided by government and the public are defrauded, 
regulators have responded by increasing the regulatory scrutiny of the charity sector, including 
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requiring charities to report performance if they are to enjoy taxation concessions and other 
benefits (Mayer & Wilson, 2010). Nevertheless, the disparity in charity size is one factor that makes 
regulation of charities a ‘complex problem’ (Mayer & Wilson, 2010). For example, Mayer and Wilson 
(2010) note that 75% of charities are small (expenditure is less than US$500,000) and demands for 
disclosure compliance may be burdensome for these charities. Enforcement barriers are a further 
issue; including regulators’ constrained resources (Mayer & Wilson, 2010). Design of the appropriate 
form of regulation is therefore challenging.  
3. Arguments for charity regulation  
A number of theories of regulation and the fact that the need and imposition of regulation is both 
contextually and temporally specific, make discussions of regulation complex (Hantke-Domas, 2003). 
While neo-classical theorists discourage public regulatory intervention, the recognition that markets 
are not perfectly efficient has given rise to two rationales for regulation - public interest (as argued 
by Stigler, 1971), and public choice theory (as argued for by Peltzman, 1976). 
The public interest theory of regulation asserts that regulation is necessary to deal effectively with 
substantive resource distribution problems and is within the rational-economic perspective 
(Christensen & Lægreid, 2006). Public interest theory argues that business operations prefer their 
private interests rather than the public interest and that, due to information asymmetry, regulation 
is needed to protect the public interest. This theory specifically acknowledges market failure 
(Chalmers, Godfrey, & Lynch, 2012). Regulation may be used to reduce the likelihood that a 
monopoly will under-provide a good or service. A regulator may also facilitate activities to address 
information asymmetries and assist fair distribution of resources (Hantke-Domas, 2003). This could 
be applied to charities in that, for example, a regulator focused on fundraising may monitor whether 
charities’ funds (donations and grants) are applied appropriately to a charitable purpose and thus, to 
improve confidence in the ‘donor market’ (Breen, 2009; Cordery, 2013). 
Public interest theory suggests that government may also regulate to restrict entry to ensure public 
safety and quality, often building (or supporting) a market to efficiently establish prices and quality 
(as would happen for a donor market) (Chalmers et al., 2012; Christensen & Lægreid, 2006; Stigler, 
1971). Mechanisms for evicting or punishing miscreants are also tools of restrictive entry regulation 
and (as can be seen from the newly established regulators) much effort of new regulators is applied 
to registration and compliance with entry restrictions. Regulation mandating organizational 
disclosure of specific issues (especially financial statements), is less interventionist than regulation 
that restricts entry to a particular market, and is a common policy tool (Breen, 2013; Solomons, 
1978). Financial reporting regulation within the securities markets began as a reaction to insufficient 
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voluntary disclosure to maintain an internationally efficient marketplace (Solomons, 1978). By 
restricting incentives and opportunities for reporting manipulation, regulators aim to restore market 
confidence, encourage investor participation, and improve issuers’ governance (Solomons, 1978). 
Such regulation for disclosure is likely to be in the public interest, but will require regulated 
organizations to collect and process new information, increase their dissemination and accept 
assurance costs. Charity regulators take a similar approach, but often reduce the reporting burden 
on smaller charities in recognition of those costs (Cordery, 2013). 
Public choice theory asserts that most regulation is merely a tool for addressing perceived problems, 
and that often the promise of regulation serving the public interest is not realised. This is due to 
rational ignorance, the self-interest of the politicians and public servants who regulate, and the 
possibility of regulatory capture (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006). Peltzman (1976) notes that rational 
regulators will seek to maximize political returns, rather than purely economic returns. Extrapolating 
this argument to the charities sector suggests that charity regulation may be perceived as “good” 
politically, especially when government financially supports charities, but such regulation could 
increase charities’ costs and change resource flows without necessarily increasing donors’ trust and 
confidence. Therefore, public choice highlights the necessity for regulatory efficiency so that 
regulatory costs do not exceed benefits.  
Regulators need adequate funding, if both their law-making and enforcement roles are to be 
effective. “Governments regulate charities in a variety of ways and through a variety of government 
agencies” (Mayer & Wilson, 2010, p. 689). For example, the United States (US) regulator is the 
Internal Revenue Service, and the tax department is also used in Canada. However in England and 
Wales, the regulator is an independent organisation, while in other countries it is within another 
government department (See Table 1). This is a structural decision which may be informed by the 
theoretical motivation to regulate, but also by historic structures in particular countries (for example, 
Irvine & Ryan, 2013).  
Government regulators frequently require charities to register, file returns, and be subject to audit 
on a random basis (as presaged by Solomons, 1978). Further, some regulators choose to respond to 
complaints from the public through audits and enquiries. However, recent reports show that the US 
regulator, the Inland Revenue Service (IRS), examined merely 1.36% of returns from tax-exempt 
organizations in 2011 (ten years earlier it was as low as 0.29%), while the Charity Commission of 
England and Wales reported an audit rate of 0.33% (Breen, 2013). Since then, budget cuts have 
forced a re-assessment of activity. Yet Simon (1995) notes that, when charity regulators limit their 
audit activity in order to reduce regulatory costs, lawless activity can ensue. As an example of the 
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costs of regulation, Table 1 shows a summary of the cost data from seven different countries that 
currently have a charities regulator.  
Table 1: Comparison of regulators, number of charities and costs as at April 20141 
Country Number of 
registered 
charities 
Cost of regulator 
(in local currency 
and €)  
Costs (in €) 
divided by # 
charities 
Independent? 
Australia 60,000 
expected 
(1,643 
currently) 
AU$14m (€9.36m) €156 ( per 
expected number) 
€5,697 per current 
registrations 
Yes, but the Australian 
Charities and Not-for-
Profits Commission 
(Repeal) (No 1) Bill 2014 
plans to disestablish it 
Canada 86,000 CAN$29.6m 
(€19.44m) 
€186 Part of Inland Revenue 
but reports directly to 
Parliament 
England and 
Wales 
165,000 £20m (€36m) €121 Yes 
Ireland 8,000 
expected (0 
currently) 
€1m (£0.82m) €125 ( per 
expected number) 
Yes 
New Zealand 27,000 NZ$6.3m (€3.93m) €120 No, from 2012 became a 
part of Department of 
Internal Affairs 
Scotland 23,800 £3.05m (€3.71m) €128 Yes 
Singapore2 2,130 SING$6.4m 
(€3.69m) 
€1,418 No, was Inland Revenue 
and now part of Ministry 
of Culture Community 
and Youth  
 
It can be seen that the costs of emergent regulators (e.g. Australia) is high due to their establishment 
phase, while the regulators in England and Wales, New Zealand and Scotland operate on €120-130 
per registered charity. Nevertheless, all have suffered budget cuts. To respond to shrinking 
government budgets, Mayer and Wilson (2010, p. 527) suggest that “options that look instead to 
self-regulation by charities or their supporters are therefore attractive”. From the theory analysed 
above, members were identified as having a particular interest in the charities they establish and 
support (Ben-Ner, 1986; Weisbrod, 1989).  Freeman (1984) agreed that stakeholders’ management 
can reduce the need for government regulatory activity, while Fishman (2003) suggests that citizens 
                                                          
1  Information from Australian Charities and Not-for-profits Commission International charity regulators’ 
meeting 8-9 April 2014. Downloaded 5 May 2014 from: 
http://www.acnc.gov.au/ACNC/Pblctns/Rpts/IntReg/ACNC/Publications/Reports/InternationalReg.aspx?no
left=1. 
2  The Singapore Commissioner of Charities is also concerned with Institutions of a Public Character 
(Commissioner of Charities, 2012)  
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should be empowered to actively leverage regulators’ efforts. Nevertheless, private individuals may 
lack “standing” or the legal ability to challenge charities’ decisions through the courts (Mayer & 
Wilson, 2010). The exceptions to this are members of charities and trustees or directors (Mayer & 
Wilson, 2010). How, therefore, can regulatory reform draw on such legally empowered parties and 
yet ensure that monitoring occurs? 
4. Differentiated regulation  
Regulatory reform is a key aspect of New Public Management, with early reformers seeking to ‘roll 
back the state’ and, more recently, to ensure better regulation (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006). This 
has also led to new means of regulation, from an institutional point of view and in respect of 
alternative regulatory practices (Hansen & Pedersen, 2005). These alternatives to traditional 
approaches include co-regulation (as can be seen, for example in fund-riaising regulation in Canada 
(Phillips, 2012)), self-regulation, targeted taxes, and differentiated regulation. For example, when 
regulators seek to introduce higher standards for buildings or carbon emission, they may 
differentiate between new buildings or vehicles and old ones, through taxes or specific regulations. 
Vintage-differentiated regulation (grandfathering) holds newly constructed facilities and vehicles to 
a higher quality than pre-existing facilities (Gruenspecht, 1982; Stavin, 2006).v A further example of 
differentiated regulation is also in the environmental space where, in a study of recycling policies, 
Feldman and Perez (2012) found that optimal social policies required different regulatory strategies 
depending on the individuals involved.  
In respect of disclosure, New Zealand provides an example, as for-profit electricity distribution 
businesses are required to report against specific price and quality metrics, and yet consumer-
owned electricity distribution businesses are exempt from this reporting (Commerce Act, 1986 
s.54D). This exemption relates to the ability of consumer-owners to monitor the prices and quality of 
their own electricity distribution business in the manner described by Ben-Ner (1986) in respect of 
trust goods.  
Thus, differentiated regulation allows regulators to scan the field and regulate only those that need 
it, or to regulate some participants differently from others. Joint monitoring by both regulators and 
stakeholders may be an option (Breen, 2009). For example, charities that rely on grants and/or 
donations from the general public (stakeholders) are more likely to file their financial statements 
with the regulator earlier (Reheul, Caneghem, & Verbruggen, 2012) and to subject their financial 
statements to audit (Kitching, 2009). While Weisbrod and Dominguez (1986) and Posnett and 
Sandler (1989) found that significant donors do analyse financial statements before donating, 
nevertheless Verbruggen, Christiaens and Milis (2011) argue that donors may not be as interested in 
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financial reporting as a government funder, raising questions over the ability of a diverse public 
donor group (who is not legally empowered) to monitor effectively.  
If the costs of regulation are high, but there is no improvement in public trust and confidence, then 
it may be well-intentioned (consistent with public interest) but ineffective, or simply be a tool to 
promote the interests of politicians/regulators without necessarily being intended to be effective (as 
argued by public choice theory). In either case, tools to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
regulation should be considered. We propose differentiated regulation as an effective measure. In 
particular, we hypothesize that some charities will be more likely to benefit from regulation: these 
will be the charities that are funded mainly by public donations (and arise to combat market failure 
as argued by Rose-Ackerman, 1986) and/or charities that receive funds for social services delivery 
(and arise to combat government failure as argued by Weisbrod, 1988). It is these charities that 
government would seek to assess whether or not they are working in the public interest, as they 
would have been established in response to market failure or government failure (as noted by Rose-
Ackerman, 1986; Weisbrod, 1988). We expect that other charities would be more likely to benefit 
from monitoring by their major resource providers – these may be member organizations with 
member managers (including deliverers of trust goods as argued by Ben-Ner, 1986), and those 
managed by trustees, such as philanthropists who seek to redistribute wealth, and providers of 
infrastructure to communities and other nonprofit organizations. For these latter, the argument is 
related not only to the reason for establishment, but also the standing of relevant stakeholders.  
The following section describes an empirical study on New Zealand data which demonstrates the 
feasibility of segmentation and hence the practicality of differentiated regulation.  
5. Empirical study  
5.1. Context, costs and confidence 
The data used in this research is from the register of the New Zealand Charities Commission which 
was established as an independent Crown Entity in 2005 to accept registrations from 1 July 2007. At 
the time of the data collection in 2012, the Charities Commission had reached a ‘normal phase’ of 
operation following its start-up and registration of charities. However, the Commission subsequently 
was transferred into a government department and is now known as Charity Services. The regulator 
experienced a prolonged gestation. Concern had been expressed that organisations were being 
structured as charities in order to utilise tax benefits for tax avoidance, and various bodies 
recommended that a new regulator be established to register and monitor charities (these included: 
New Zealand Working Party on Charities and Sporting Bodies, 1989; Newell, 1997; Working Party on 
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Registration Reporting and Monitoring of Charities, 2002). Charities that demonstrate one of these 
purposes are able to register and receive the benefits of registration. Furthermore, the lack of 
knowledge about the extent of government support to charities provided a strong impetus to charity 
regulation, as little data existed on charities’ incomes and the levels of donations made to 
them(Slack & Leung-Wai, 2007). Such information had the potential to be useful for policy-making as 
well as to restrict entry to charity-specific (tax) benefits.   
The Charities Act 2005 (2005) enshrined in New Zealand Law the four heads of charity classified by 
Lord McNaughton in the well-known “Pemsel case” of 1891 (The Commissioners for Special Purposes 
of the Income Tax v. John Frederick Pemsel). This case has been foundational in decisions on 
appropriate charitable purposes and exemption from income tax in England and Wales (Gousmett, 
2009) as well as New Zealand. The main purposes that define a charity are: the relief of poverty, the 
advancement of education, the advancement of religion, or other purposes beneficial to the 
community (Charities Act, 20052012 s.5(1)).  
Following the establishment of the register, the number of registered charities grew steadily to 
27,000 as at 2013.vi Each charity is required to file annually their financial statements and complete 
a question with the same data in pro-forma categories. They are also required to provide details of 
the charity’s officers and other statistical information. vii The cost of this regulatory regime comprises 
the direct costs of the regulator, the compliance costs for the registered charities, and the welfare 
costs associated with the change in resource allocation resulting from operation of the regime. We 
have no information on the latter categories of costs but the on-going costs of the regulator are 
€120 per registered charity as shown in Table 1. In addition to the registration process, the regulator 
carried out 634 investigations in 2011 (2.8% of registered charities) and 360 investigations in 2012 
(1.48% of registered charities) (Charities Commission, 2012). In both years, more than 100 
investigations remained uncompleted at year end.  
It is unclear whether philanthropy has increased since the regulator has been established, however 
donation rebates to individuals have almost doubled from NZ$119 million in 2005 (Slack & Leung-
Wai, 2007) to NZ$203 million in 2011,viii particularly following the removal of the tax-cap on 
donation rebates which was likely to result in more participants in the ‘donor market’ (see Cullen & 
Dunne, 2006). However, bi-annual surveys of public trust and confidence in charities evidence a 
decline in the number of respondents who have high trust in charities – from 58% in 2008 to 44% in 
2012 (UMR Research, 2010, 2012).  
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In addition to donations, charities receive significant funds from government departments in the 
way of contracts and grants to charities of NZ$1.25 billion in 2006 (against total government 
expenditure of NZ$54.2 billion) (Department of Internal Affairs, 2007). Total contracts and grants are 
likely to be higher, as this figure did not include second tier payments. The data indicate that, while 
the regulation cost may not be significant for government, the government resources flowing into 
the sector by way of donation rebates and contracting,  means it is important to ensure efficient 
regulation.  
We now turn to the question of whether the charities can be segmented into different ‘types’, for 
example, those funded mainly by donations (and arise to combat market failure as argued by Rose-
Ackerman, 1986), charities that receive funds for social services delivery (and arise to combat 
government failure as argued by Weisbrod, 1988), member organizations with member managers 
(including deliverers of trust goods as argued by Ben-Ner, 1986), those managed by trustees, such as 
philanthropists who seek to redistribute wealth, and providers of infrastructure to communities and 
other nonprofit organizations.  
5.2.  Analysis of “Types” of Registered Charities 
Market failure and government failure theories suggest that donative and social services charities 
are most likely to register with a regulator to receive tax benefits (see Rose-Ackerman, 1986; 
Weisbrod, 1988, 1989) and yet others may register as well, adding additional regulatory costs in a 
constrained environment. We used data from the New Zealand Charities’ Register to determine 
whether, on the basis of revenue sources, the charities separated into different “types” which could 
be described based on their revenue, expenditures, assets and liabilities.  We further were 
interested in whether or not any of these “types” could be called donative (as per Rose-Ackerman, 
1986), social service charities (as per Weisbrod, 1988), membership charities (as per Ben-Ner, 1986), 
philanthropists seeking to re-distribute wealth, or providers of infrastructure to the community or 
other nonprofit organizations. Financial statements of a stratified random sample of 835 registered 
charities were extracted from the Register and analysed.ix The sample was stratified by the sector 
chosen by the charities from a list of twelve different sectors when they file their financial 
statements.x Approximately half of the sample had expenditure of less than NZ$40,000 (425) and 
the remainder (410) had expenditure greater than NZ$40,000 but less than NZ$2,000,000.xi The 
population from which this sample was drawn comprised 95.96% of the total register. We excluded 
large charities that comprise the balance as they were likely to be more business-oriented than 
small- and medium-sized charities.  
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Financial data filed by the charities in a pro-forma document was downloaded, along with their 
annual financial statements which they were required to file contemporaneously. These latter were 
separately entered into a spreadsheet to check the validity of the pro-forma data filed with the 
regulator. This was undertaken due to the known errors in this and similar filings with regulators 
(Cordery & Patel, 2011; Keating & Frumkin, 2003). These organizations’ revenues and expenditures 
were converted to ratios and analysed to enable comparisons.xii Charities with zero total revenue 
were omitted from the analysis, resulting finally in a data set of 803 charities.  
We then used cluster analysis on the data set of 803 charities. Cluster analysis (specifically K-means 
cluster analysis) was used because we were looking for “types” or clusters of charities which met 
most, if not all, of the following criteria: 
1. The different “types” generated by the statistical algorithm should, as much as possible be 
very different in terms of their dominant source(s) of revenue. That is, the different “types” 
defined by the statistical algorithm should provide groupings which are intuitively and 
meaningfully different.  
2. Individual charities should, as much as possible, clearly belong to only one “type”.  That is, 
the mean percent of each revenue source should be very different from one charity “type” to 
another. 
3. The different “types” of charities should each be very homogeneous.  That is, the percent 
revenues should not vary a lot within each type. 
4. The clustering algorithm should be reproducible.  That is, when the cluster definitions based 
on the original data set of 803 charities are used in other data sets of charities, the charity 
“types” thus defined should also be very different, meaningful and homogeneous. For this 
reason, a second data set, a simple random sample of 296 further registered charities was 
used to verify the clustering algorithm.   
In order to be useful, clusters should capture the data’s natural structure (Tan, Steinbach, & Kumar, 
2004). K-means clustering is the most widely used clustering algorithm and assigns each case to one 
partitional cluster, rather than allowing over-lapping clusters (Tan et al., 2004). Thus, K-means 
clustering does not allow nested or hierarchical sub-clusters, so that data should belong to one 
cluster only. Further, K-means clustering is a complete clustering system rather than the partial 
clustering achieved by DBSCAN density-bound clustering algorithms (Tan et al., 2004). Nevertheless, 
K-means clustering has the limitation that the user chooses the number of clusters to be used. 
Therefore, we first used hierarchical clustering to determine the best cluster number for the 803 
charities in the file. It suggested four clusters. K-means clustering was then performed on the 803 
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charities with 4, 5, and 6 clusters. The four cluster model included two clusters with 300 or more 
members, while the five cluster model included only one large (300+) cluster. The six cluster model 
included one cluster with only 5 members, which would not allow for any rigorous descriptive 
statistics. We therefore chose the five cluster model as the most useful for analysis. We also (as 
noted above) validated the cluster algorithm with a second data set, as recommended by Tan et al 
(2004). 
We next extended the description of the five clusters beyond the revenue ratios, to include an 
analysis of expenditure, liabilities and assets. This allowed us to further describe our clusters and 
assess their suitability; finally, we validated the cluster definitions with the second sample of 296 
charities (140 small and 156 medium-sized). For each of these 296 charities, the distance from the 
centroid of each cluster (from the analysis of the 803) was calculated, and the charity was assigned 
to the cluster whose centroid was closest. We then examined the data from this second data set to 
determine if they had a similar distribution of revenues, expenditures, assets and liabilities to the 
clusters in the first data set, and to examine whether the clusters in the second data set were 
distinct and homogeneous. We used one-way ANOVA and Post Hoc tests to see how the percent 
revenue means and standard deviations in this new sample met or did not meet our criteria for an 
adequate categorization of charities, and how the clusters in this second set resembled, or not, the 
clusters from the exploratory cluster analysis on the first set. The results of the initial clustering and 
validation follow. 
 5.2.1. Development and Description of  Clusters 
In this sub-section we present the results from the clustering. The validation of the findings is 
discussed in section 5.2.2. Table 2 provides the overall results of the one-way ANOVA for the clusters 
based on revenue sources. As expected, since the clusters were defined by revenue sources, for all 
revenue sources the mean percents were significantly different by cluster. However, we were 
interested in how well the group means separated out by revenue source(s).  We therefore 
examined the results of the Post Hoc tests (Tukey’s) to see whether the clusters fell into distinct 
groupings with respect to the revenue types.  For example, from Table 2, we see that the revenue 
source “sponsorships” clearly separates the 5 clusters into two groups, which could be called high 
versus low levels of sponsorship, because there is no statistical overlap in the means. Considering all 
revenue sources, the Post Hoc tests indicate no more than one cluster overlapping for any 
comparison. This fits the requirements stated above to have group means that are very different, as 
well as small standard deviations within each cluster to establish a statistical difference. Thus we can 
conclude that each revenue type splits the file of charities into distinct groups of clusters. 
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Table 2: Results of ANOVA comparison of means by Revenue Cluster.    
Revenue Type Overall F statistic p-value Post Hoc result:  range of cluster means 
Public/ Donations 1218.174 0.000 4 groups, 1,1,0 overlap: 3.56%-85.06% 
Sponsorships 10.615 0.000 2 groups, no overlap; 0.00% - 4.99% 
Goods and services 991.920 0.000 3 groups, 1 overlapping: 1.20%-72.42% 
Bequests 9.581 0.000 2 groups: no overlap: 0.00%-3.80% 
Investments 2370.176 0.000 3 groups, no overlap: 3.09%-92.20% 
Gains/ Other 21.524 0.000 2 groups, no overlap; 1.28% - 12.94% 
Members 203.494 0.000 2 groups, no overlap: 0.42%- 41.70% 
Rental 1138.88 0.000 2 groups, no overlap: 0.74-73.43% 
 
The next question is whether a consideration of all the revenue types together defines meaningful 
distinct clusters. Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations of the revenue sources by 
Revenue Cluster and provides names for each of these clusters. From Table 3, it can be seen that for 
each Revenue Source, one mean is clearly larger than the others (often several times larger). We can 
therefore say that the Revenue Clusters reflect different dominant revenue sources. Because of this, 
we have named the clusters according to their dominant revenue source. We called Cluster 1 the 
“Classic Charity” Cluster as 85.06% of its revenue is derived from public donations and 6.26% from 
goods and services – a total of 91.32% of income from these sources (SD=11.80). Further, Cluster 2 
was named “Service Providers” as 89.10% of their income also derived from these combined sources 
(SD=12.82), but there was a much lower percentage (16.48%) from public donations, with the 
majority of their revenue (72.42%) being derived from goods and services. The revenues of the 
cluster were not widely diversified, except for the Cluster 3 charities which we termed “Member 
Organizations” and which had more diverse revenue sources. It can be observed from Tables 4 and 5 
(below) that, although the clusters were defined on the basis of revenue, there were statistically 
significant differences in mean expenditures and in mean assets and liabilities. They are as follows:  
 Cluster 1: Classic charities: receive the great majority of their income from public donations 
(philanthropy). They are differentiated from membership organizations and service providers, 
as they focus on charitable support, rather than members and services alone. They are second 
only to service providers in their expenditure on staff and services.  In addition, classic charities 
have the most cash assets of all the charities identified in this taxonomy. 
 Cluster 2: Service providers: receive most funds for delivering goods and services for 
government and expend most of their funds on services and staffing. Service providers are most 
likely to have short term loans – these will include creditors, staff accruals, and short term 
leasing arrangements, however they also hold a large percentage of their assets in cash, 
especially when compared to the member-based, infrastructure and trusts/grantor  charities. 
17 
 
 Cluster 3: Member organizations:  their main forms of income are from membership and 
sponsorship and, for the charities analysed, these were the main recipients of bequests 
(although it is not a large percentage of total income). In addition, these charities record the 
highest overhead expenditure of all the charity clusters and make the least amount of grants.  
 Cluster 4: Infrastructure providers: provide facilities, structures and systems to support and 
coordinate front-line service organizations so that they in turn can deliver their missions more 
effectively. For example, these might be accommodation for a service, a campsite or community 
hall. These charities receive the majority of their income from rents and their expenditure on 
financing confirms their difference from other clusters. They are the largest owners of Property, 
Plant and Equipment and are most likely to have loans from members and other sources.   
 Cluster 5: Trusts/Grantors: have the most short term investments and receive the majority of 
their funds from these investments. They also pay out the most grants and have low 
expenditure on other classifications such as staff and overheads. 
 
Table 3: Means and Standard Deviations of charities’ revenue variables by Revenue Cluster 
 
 
Revenue Type 
Cluster 1 
(Classic 
Charity)  
N= 395 
Cluster 2 
(Service 
Provider)  
N= 200 
Cluster 3 ** 
(Member 
organization) 
N= 64 
Cluster 4 
(Infrastructure 
provider)  
N= 38 
Cluster 5 
(Trust/ 
grantor)  
N= 106 
Public / Donations 
(p = 0.000)* 
85.06%†† 
+ 14.98 
16.68% 
+ 16.55 
15.51% 
+ 15.68 
9.52% 
+ 15.40 
3.56%† 
+ 8.89 
Goods & services 
(p = 0.000) 
6.26% 
+ 10.44 
72.42%†† 
+ 19.51 
11.67% 
+ 13.10 
3.96% 
+ 8.86 
1.20%† 
+ 4.94 
Bequests 
(p = 0.000) 
0.14% 
+ 1.82 
0.0030%† 
+ 0.0411 
3.80%†† 
+ 15.77 
0.0042% 
+ 0.261 
0.04% 
+ 0.40 
Investments 
(p = 0.000) 
3.09%† 
+ 6.36 
3.50% 
+ 6.60 
8.07% 
+ 10.86 
9.33% 
+ 14.36 
92.20%†† 
+ 14.07 
Members 
(p = 0.000) 
2.13% 
+ 5.67 
3.65% 
+ 8.07 
41.70%†† 
+ 31.69 
0.42%† 
+ 2.48 
0.78% 
+ 3.65 
Rental 
(p = 0.000) 
1.54% 
+ 5.15 
0.99% 
+ 3.42 
1.33% 
+ 4.67 
73.43%†† 
+ 21.38 
0.74%† 
+ 4.29 
Sponsorship 
(p = 0.000) 
0.36% 
+ 2.05 
1.48% 
+ 5.70 
4.99%†† 
+ 16.70 
0.034% 
+ 0.21 
0.00%† 
+ 0.00 
Other *** 1.41% 1.28%† 12.94%†† 3.30% 1.48% 
(p = 0.000) + 4.84 + 4.64 + 28.73 +10.62 + 5.53 
*       The p-value is from the one-way ANOVA of each revenue source by cluster. 
**  The membership cluster was very diverse with many charities receiving significant 
percentage of their revenue from ‘other’ sources.  
***  Other includes revenue designated as “other”, “foreign exchange (and other asset 
revaluation) profits”, and “insurance claims”.  
†  Indicates the lowest mean for this variable  
††  Indicates the highest mean for this variable    
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To achieve a visual representation of the distribution of the charities, we plotted the data using 
Multidimensional Scaling (MDS). MDS is a way of representing the distances or dissimilarities 
between cases into two- or three- dimensional space, as defined by the variables specified. For 
example, the MDS plot of the charities based on the revenue percent variables (Bequests, Goods and 
Services, Investment income, Membership, Public Donations, Rental, Sponsorship), considers how 
dissimilar the charities are from each other, based on the different values of these variables. In our 
case, a Euclidean metric was used (as was used in the cluster analysis). Once the charities data had 
been mapped (in eight revenue dimensions and viewed in two-dimensional space), they were 
labelled by their cluster. We could then determine visually whether or not the charities in the same 
cluster were close together with respect to these variables. The MDS plot of these variables 
identified by cluster is shown in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: MDS plot of charities clusters based on revenue patterns  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The MDS plot in Figure 1 separates out the clusters quite well in two-dimensional space. That is to 
say, the clusters as defined have quite different patterns of revenue. None of these clusters is far 
away from the others, but they are distinct. A few member charities do not fit the pattern well (top 
left), however the cast majority of charities separate into five distinct groups.  
Table 3 clearly describes the differences in means between the Revenue Clusters. However, we also 
sought to ascertain whether there was a difference in other financial elements based on cluster 
type. The analysis of variance results in Table 4 show that the revenue-based clusters also have 
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different means for the expenditure variables. While they are not as marked as the difference in the 
revenue variable means, it can be seen that the patterns of expenditure map to the Revenue 
Clusters. These differences are further elaborated on in the definitions of the clusters above. 
Table 4: Means and Standard Deviations of charities’ expenditure variables by revenue cluster 
 
Expenditure 
 Type 
Cluster 1 
(Classic 
Charity)  
N= 394 
Cluster 2 
(Service 
Provider)  
N= 200 
Cluster 3 
(Member 
organization) 
N= 63 
Cluster 4 
(Infrastructure 
provider)  
N= 38 
Cluster 5 
(Trust/ 
grantor)  
N= 106 
Financing** 
(p = 0.017)* 
1.70% 
+ 9.98 
0.66% 
+ 2.23 
0.17%† 
+ 0.47 
5.71%†† 
+ 14.24 
1.77% 
+ 11.69 
Fundraising 
(p = 0.000) 
5.70%†† 
+ 15.41 
0.93% 
+ 3.51 
3.01% 
+ 11.20 
0.50% 
+ 2.70 
0.21%† 
+ 2.02 
Grants 
(p = 0.000) 
12.73% 
+ 28.03 
6.17% 
+ 16.17 
5.78%† 
+ 18.86 
9.49% 
+ 21.63 
41.66%†† 
+ 42.79 
Overhead 
(p = 0.018) 
29.87% 
+ 29.66 
27.71% 
+ 24.22 
38.94%†† 
+ 31.38 
30.85% 
+ 26.39 
23.53%† 
+ 33.49 
Staff 
(p = 0.000) 
20.36%†† 
+ 29.32 
17.05% 
+ 25.68 
8.16% 
+ 16.03 
9.03% 
+ 20.17 
1.88%† 
+ 8.43 
Services 
(p = 0.000) 
16.06% 
+ 24.40 
36.25%†† 
+ 29.85 
25.76% 
+27.75 
12.67% 
+ 20.20 
8.22%† 
+ 22.42 
*  The p-value is from the one-way ANOVA of each expenditure variable by cluster. 
**  Financing expenditure is spending on interest and leases.   
†  Indicates the lowest mean for this variable  
††  Indicates the highest mean/s for this variable    
 
Table 5 presents the means and standard deviations of charities’ assets and liabilities variables by 
Revenue Cluster. This also shows that there are differences in the clusters as they are defined 
(specifically in terms of investments in Trusts/grantors, Property, Plant and Equipment and Long-
term borrowing by Infrastructure providers. 
Table 5: Means and Standard Deviations of charities’ asset and liability variables by revenue 
cluster 
 
Asset and  
Liability 
 Type 
Cluster 1 
(Classic 
Charity)  
N= 394 
Cluster 2 
(Service 
Provider) 
N= 200 
Cluster 3 
(Member 
organization) 
N= 63 
Cluster 4 
(Infrastructure 
provider)  
N= 38 
Cluster 5 
(Trust/ 
grantor)  
 N= 106 
Assets 
Cash  
(p = 0.000)* 
49.42%†† 
+ 39.31 
41.26% 
+ 37.04 
34.58% 
+ 38.68 
11.82%† 
+ 25.78 
22.58% 
+ 35.42 
Short Term assets  
(p = 0.033) 
5.08% 
+ 14.82 
8.21%†† 
+ 18.32 
4.08% 
+ 13.56 
2.39%† 
+ 8.26 
3.41% 
+ 14.36 
Investments 
(p = 0.000) 
17.99% 
+ 29.53 
17.59%† 
+ 27.26 
36.76% 
+ 37.64 
17.61% 
+ 26.90 
67.69%†† 
+ 39.08 
Property, Plant &Equip  
(p = 0.000) 
21.05% 
+ 32.55 
28.56% 
+ 34.67 
18.83% 
+ 29.12 
65.81%†† 
+ 36.35 
1.47%† 
+ 7.98 
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Liabilities 
Grants 
(p = 0.005) 
8.02%†† 
+ 24.27 
6.42% 
+ 19.88 
0.95%† 
+ 7.53 
2.31% 
+ 11.02 
1.24% 
+ 10.14 
Long-term Borrowing 
(p=0.000) 
6.05% 
+ 21.55 
7.24% 
+ 22.92 
3.96% 
+ 17.22 
25.38%†† 
+ 40.68 
2.80%† 
+ 16.50 
Member Loans 
(p = 0.044) 
0.27% 
+ 3.48 
0.47% 
+ 4.84 
0.00%† 
+ 0.0000 
2.93%†† 
+ 14.07 
1.81% 
+ 13.13 
Short Term Liabilities 
(p=0.001) 
29.86% 
+ 41.59 
33.75%†† 
+ 39.92 
33.82% 
+ 42.00 
27.07% 
+ 37.40 
13.96%† 
+ 33.60 
*  The p-value is from the one-way ANOVA of each expenditure variable by cluster.   
†  Indicates the lowest mean for this variable  
††  Indicates the highest mean/s for this variable    
 
5.2.2. Validation of the Revenue Clusters 
As noted above, it is good practice to validate the cluster algorithm with a second data set (Tan et al., 
2004). This confirmatory set (296 different registered charities) was clustered according to the 
Revenue Clusters defined on the original data set of 803 charities (see Table 3 above). We found 
very similar patterns of revenues, expenditures, assets and liabilities by cluster. For example, classic 
charities (Cluster 1) in the original 803 received 85.06% revenue from public/donations (see Table 3) 
and the similar cluster from the new 296 received 85.21% revenue from the same source (the 
highest of the clusters). Further, Table 3 shows that service providers (Cluster 2) in the original 803 
received 72.42% revenue from goods and services and the similar cluster from the new 296 charities 
received 73.43% revenue from goods and services (again, the highest of all the clusters), while 
trusts/grantors (Cluster 5) in the original 803 received 92.20% revenue from investment and the 
similar cluster from the new 296 received 92.64% from investment. 
The same held true for expenditures in the confirmatory data set (of 296). Service providers (Cluster 
2) in the original 803 expended 36.25% on services (see Table 4) and the similar cluster from the new 
296 charities expended 34.95% on services. Further, Table 4 shows that 41.66% of trusts/grantors’ 
(Cluster 5) expenditure in the original 803 was on grants and the similar cluster from the new 296 
expended 42.60% on grants.  
With respect to assets and liabilities, service providers (Cluster 2) and classic charities (Cluster 1) in 
the original 803 recorded 41.26% and 49.42% cash assets respectively (see Table 5) and the similar 
clusters from the new 296 charities recorded 41.41% and 37.45% in cash assets respectively. The 
mean for social services was almost identical; however, classic charities held slightly less in the 
simple random sample of 296 than the stratified sample of 803 charities. Further, Table 5 shows that 
in the original 803 infrastructure providers (Cluster 4) hold 65.81% of their assets in Property, Plant 
21 
 
and & Equipment (PP&E) and the similar cluster from the new 296 held 45.29% in PP&E. Finally, 
trusts/grantors (Cluster 5) in the original 803 held 67.69% in investments (see Table 5) and the 
similar cluster from the new 296 charities held 65.70% in investments. 
This consistency in patterns of revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities between the two different 
data sets suggest that this method of grouping charities is robust and reflects a repeatable pattern in 
New Zealand charities. Further analysis of the charities within each cluster was undertaken to 
estimate the percentages within the population of regulated organizations. We used the second 
sample of 296 charities (used to validate the clustering, as discussed in section 5.2), which was a 
simple random sample of regulated charities in New Zealand. The standard 95% confidence interval 
for a proportion was used and is shown in Table 6. This data is now discussed. 
5.2.3 A schema for classifying organizations subject to public regulation 
From the regulation theory literature reviewed, we expect that the types of charities that would 
benefit most from regulation and which government would be most interested in regulating would 
be those that purport to act in the public interest. Governments would be most interested to ensure 
that these charities are eligible for their exemptions from income tax and that the tax credits that 
donors can claim are worthwhile. Charities working in the public interest will be those that receive a 
high levels of public donations (and therefore arise from market failure, as argued by Rose-
Ackerman, 1986); and/or charities that provide social services (as Weisbrod, 1988 argues, these arise 
to reduce government failure). These were identified by the cluster analysis as Cluster 1 (“Classic 
Charities”) and Cluster 2 (“Service Providers”).  
Table 6: Stakeholder-driven regulation model 
Cluster Main funder Secondary funders Type of regulation 
1. Classic charity  
34.1% + 5.4% 
Donations  Services, 
investments, 
members and rental. 
Publicly regulated due 
to majority of funding 
from donations. 
2. Service provider 
38.9% + 5.55% 
Funders of goods 
and services 
Donations, 
investments, 
members 
Publicly regulated due 
to government-funded 
services. 
3. Member organization 
8.1% + 3.11% 
Membership Services, sponsors, 
investments and 
donations 
Self-regulated by 
member-managers. 
(Differentiated) 
4. Infrastructure provider 
3.7% + 2.15% 
Rental Investments and 
donations 
Self-regulated by 
trustees/management. 
(Differentiated) 
5. Trust/grantor  
15.2% + 4.09% 
Investments Donations and rental Self-regulated by 
trustees /management. 
(Differentiated) 
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As shown in Table 6, this research showed that Cluster 1 (“Classic Charities”) and Cluster 2 (“Service 
Providers”) total only between 67.94% and 78.06% of all registered (regulated) charities (73 +5.06%). 
On the other hand, the three other clusters (Cluster 3: “Member Organizations”; Cluster 4 
“Infrastructure Providers”; Cluster 5: “Trusts/grantors”) receive low levels of revenue from public 
donations and public funding of goods and services.These “types” have arisen due to contract failure 
and/or to increase social capital (as hypothesized by Ben-Ner, 1986; Bryce, 2005).Their main 
resource providers are more concentrated than the general public and they are likely to be legally 
empowered to monitor these charities (Mayer & Wilson, 2010). It therefore appears that 
government regulation of these charity “types” is a duplication of resources. In addition, we found 
that the regulator’s tight operating budget, increasing donation rebates, and government funding 
into the sector are juxtaposed against a rising number of public complaints about charities, as well as 
regulator audits, suggest declining public trust and confidence. The New Zealand case is an example 
of the need to find cost efficiencies, so that the regulator can focus on improving charity 
accountability.  
We noted earlier that differentiated regulation has been used as a policy tool in some industries. In 
electricity regulation, consumer-owners monitor the prices and quality of their own electricity 
distribution business in the manner described by Ben-Ner (1986). In that example, differentiated 
regulation has reduced the cost of monitoring as the regulator can fully audit and respond to 
complaints about a smaller number of organizations (those that meet its brief) and leave other 
(legally empowered) stakeholders to monitor the organizations which are not required to be fully 
regulated. It can be expected that the stakeholders of these other charities would provide 
monitoring in any case, but when regulatory resources are duplicated, these stakeholders receive 
false comfort from believing government also actively regulates these charities.   
Differentiated regulation could be useful when members predominate in a charity and they also 
enjoy the goods and services it provides. These members are unlikely to need a regulator in order to 
access financial and other data from charities which they fund (these would be cluster 3: “Member 
Organizations”). When members fund and manage interdependent (mutual) nonprofit entities, they 
are able to demand financial reporting from these organizations (Hansmann, 1986). It has been 
argued that such stakeholder management will be of a higher quality than that provided by the 
regulator  alone (Breen, 2013; Freeman, 1984). Further, if these stakeholders are unhappy with the 
charity’s management, members can exit by resigning and not paying their membership fees. As 
shown in Table 6, between 5% and 11.2% of registered charities are member organizations (8.1 + 
3.11%). In line with Hansmann (1986) and Ben-Ner (1986), we argue that the members should 
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already regulate these charities and that the rise of a public regulator has potentially reduced 
members’ effort with detrimental effects on public trust and confidence. 
In respect of two other clusters (4: “Infrastructure Providers and 5: “Trusts/grantors”), it is also 
apparent that donors and funders of goods and services are not the prime resource providers. 
Government’s regulatory effort is likely to have sent the wrong signal to stakeholders of entities 
which do not arise from market or government failure. Infrastructure providers represent 0.35%-
5.85% (3.7% ± 2.15%) of the population and the trusts/grantors are represent 10.91%-19.29% (15.2% 
± 4.09%) of the population. They receive funds from rental and investments respectively and are 
managed in terms of their trust deeds. In respect of investment income, Kreander, Beattie and 
McPhail (2009) confirm that organizations with investment funds should be closely monitored by 
their boards. For infrastructure organizations, their boards and management should also monitor 
rental revenue. Combined with member organizations, infrastructure providers and trusts/grantors 
represent between 21.94% and 32.06% of the total population. 
6. Conclusion  
Public trust and confidence in charities has declined and yet significant resources continue to be 
committed to the sector. Regulatory effort and monitoring has been ineffective, in part due to 
limited resources. We recommend differentiated regulation and demonstrate its feasibility by 
analysis of data on registered charities in New Zealand to show that charities do fall into distinct 
types.  We found that around 27 percent of the organizations do not receive significant funding from 
either donations nor charitable goods and services delivery. Around 8 percent of the organizations 
are member-based. and the remaining 19 percent of registrations - infrastructure providers and 
trusts/grantors - can be managed by trustees for a similar reason. These groups could be eliminated 
from the focus of the regulator and hence enable the regulator to focus its slim resources on the 
other 73% of charities that do require regulatory oversight.   
The data analysed covers 95.96 percent of the total number of registered charities in New Zealand 
and present probably the biggest regulatory challenge due to their diversity. Their profile is similar to 
that in other countries, for example Canada (Phillips, 2013), England and Wales and Ireland (Breen, 
2013) and the US (Mayer & Wilson, 2010). Hence, we are unaware of specific contextual factors that 
would make these New Zealand charities markedly different from their counterparts in other Anglo-
American countries at least.  Therefore, this analysis of disclosure-based regulation of charities 
generally could be applied by both older regulators (for example US, England and Wales) and newer 
regulators, such as the ACNC in Australia.  
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Refocusing regulatory effort to reflect differentiated regulation principles to reinstate the onus on 
members to monitor, could reduce charities’ compliance costs by reducing government monitoring 
of these charities. More importantly, this strategy would enable the regulator to re-focus its scarce 
resources and increase effort on those charities that receive a majority of their funds from donations 
and/or publicly-funded service provision. Following such a re-focus, the regulator would be better 
placed to achieve its aim to promote the public interest, and public trust and confidence in 
registered charities might increase.  
                                                          
i  Economic theories refer to nonprofit organisations in general, but this paper focuses on organisations 
defined in jurisdictions as charities, a subset of the nonprofit sector.  
iiii  For example, ‘cream-skimming’ or servicing clients that present simple, profitable cases is a problem 
endemic in health care. 
iii  That is, government fails to deliver public or collective goods that match demand. 
iv  Nevertheless, this question of unfair competition is void if there are no for-profit participants (as occurs 
when market failure is present). 
v  Differentiated regulation may also be used to open a market (to reduce a cartel and therefore as the 
antithesis of entry restriction) and is often used in the telecommunication and electricity industries to 
encourage greater competition (Peitz, 2005). Here, an asymmetry between operators with significant 
market power and those without is recognised by forcing major market players to provide newcomers with 
access to a network at prices the regulator  sets to increase access and competition (Peitz, 2005).  
vi  All of these charities were automatically donee organizations. The cap on the donor rebates was removed 
in 2008 thus increasing rebates to a maximum of the tax paid by the donor (the rebate being a third of the 
donation, no matter the taxpayer’s tax bracket). 
vii  Charities pay NZ$51.11 per annum if they file their annual statements and updates on line and NZ$75.67 if 
they send in a paper version of updates and annual accounts (amounts ex-Goods and Services Tax). 
Charities with income of less than NZ$10,000 pay no annual return fee.  
viii  2011 information downloaded from http://www.ird.govt.nz/aboutir/external-stats/revenue-refunds/ 
donations-rebates/ 1 December 2013. 
ix  The register included 21,156 organizations that had filed financial reports in November 2011, the date at 
which the register was accessed. Financial reports were progressively downloaded between November 
2011 and January 2012. 
x  Johns Hopkins University lists 12 different sectoral groupings for nonprofit organizations: culture and 
recreation, education and research, health, social services, environment, development and housing, civil 
rights, advocacy and politics, grant-making, philanthropic intermediaries and volunteerism promotion, 
international, religion, business and professional associations, unions and “not elsewhere classified” 
(Salamon & Anheier, 1992a, 1992b). Charities select their sector on their annual filing. These groupings 
were not useful to test the hypothesis as they did not separate out revenue flows and activities. 
xi  These dollar ranges were chosen as they corresponded to proposed reporting requirements. The 
population of the ‘small’ (<$40,000) segment was 11,282 and the ‘medium’ (>40,000 and <2 million) was 
9,019.  
xii  Each revenue category was expressed as a percentage of total revenue. Expenditures were expressed as a 
percentage of total expenditure and so on.  
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